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CRITIQUE AND COMMENT 
THE VICTORIAN CHARTER OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES: ORIGINS AND SCOPE 
GEORGE WILLIAMS∗ 
[The Victorian Charter of Rights is the first bill of rights to be enacted by an Australian state. It is a 
limited change to the law that does not disturb accepted principles of parliamentary sovereignty and 
does not confer powers associated with the United States Bill of Rights, such as that of courts to 
strike down legislation. Instead, the focus of the Victorian Charter of Rights is on improving the work 
of government and Parliament and thereby preventing human rights problems from arising in the 
first place. This article explores the origins of the Victorian Charter of Rights and its intended 
operation.] 
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I   INTRODUCTION 
The Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) (‘Victorian 
Charter of Rights’) is a landmark in Australia’s constitutional and political 
history. While it is not the nation’s first bill of rights, that being the Human 
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Rights Act 2004 (ACT) (‘ACT Human Rights Act’),1 it is the first such instrument 
in an Australian state. Like the Australian Capital Territory law, it is an innova-
tive, if modest, change to the Australian system of government in the form of an 
unentrenched Act of Parliament that protects a range of civil and political rights. 
The Victorian Charter of Rights marks a decisive departure, at least in Victoria, 
from the long-held notion that the best protection for human rights is the good 
sense of our parliamentary representatives as constrained by the doctrine of 
responsible government and the common law as applied by the judiciary. This 
view was fostered at the conventions held in the 1890s that drafted the Austra-
lian Constitution2 and in writings such as those of 19th century English constitu-
tional theorist, A V Dicey.3 The view has included adherents such as former 
Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies, who regarded the doctrine of responsible 
government as being the ‘ultimate guarantee of justice and individual rights’ in 
Australia.4 He argued that the doctrine meant that Australia had no need of the 
‘formality and definition’ of rights in an instrument like a bill of rights.5 In 
recent years this view has come under challenge as people have questioned 
whether the conventions attaching to responsible government, such as ministerial 
accountability, retain the same force.6 
Reliance upon the common law system has also been questioned, including by 
some of Australia’s most senior judges. For example, former Chief Justice of the 
High Court Sir Anthony Mason has remarked: 
the common law system, supplemented as it presently is by statutes designed to 
protect particular rights, does not protect fundamental rights as comprehen-
sively as do constitutional guarantees and conventions on human rights. … The 
common law is not as invincible a safeguard against violations of fundamental 
rights as it was once thought to be.7 
This perspective now commands acceptance in the United Kingdom, which 
enacted its own bill of rights in the form of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) 
c 42 (‘UK Human Rights Act’). The Victorian Charter of Rights is primarily 
based upon this law, as well as the ACT Human Rights Act and the New Zealand 
 
 1 See generally Hilary Charlesworth and Gabrielle McKinnon, ‘Australia’s First Bill of Rights: 
The Australian Capital Territory’s Human Rights Act’ (Law and Policy Paper No 28, Centre for 
International and Public Law, The Australian National University, 2006); Julie Debeljak, ‘The 
Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT): A Significant, Yet Incomplete, Step toward the Domestic Protec-
tion and Promotion of Human Rights’ (2004) 15 Public Law Review 169; Carolyn Evans, ‘Re-
sponsibility for Rights: The ACT Human Rights Act’ (2004) 32 Federal Law Review 291. 
 2 George Williams, Human Rights under the Australian Constitution (1999) ch 2. 
 3 A V Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (10th ed, 1959). See also Eric 
Barendt, ‘Dicey and Civil Liberties’ [1985] Public Law 596. 
 4 Sir Robert Menzies, Central Power in the Australian Commonwealth: An Examination of the 
Growth of Commonwealth Power in the Australian Federation (1967) 54. 
 5 Ibid. 
 6 See, eg, the report of the inquiry into allegations by members of the executive that asylum 
seekers coming to Australia by boat had thrown their children overboard: Senate Select Commit-
tee on a Certain Maritime Incident, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into a Certain Maritime 
Incident (2002). 
 7 Sir Anthony Mason, ‘The Role of a Constitutional Court in a Federation: A Comparison of the 
Australian and the United States Experience’ (1986) 16 Federal Law Review 1, 12. 
   
M.U.L.R. — Williams — page 882 of 26
  
882 Melbourne University Law Review  [Vol 30 
     
Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ), rather than upon constitutional instruments like the 
United States Bill of Rights or South African Bill of Rights. 
The enactment of the ACT Human Rights Act and Victorian Charter of Rights 
also challenges the view that Australia has a strong record of protecting human 
rights which does not need improvement through better legal protection for such 
rights. In 1967, Sir Robert Menzies, just retired as Prime Minister, remarked that 
‘the rights of individuals in Australia are as adequately protected as they are in any 
other country in the world.’8 Similarly, current Prime Minister John Howard said in 
2000 that ‘Australia’s human rights reputation compared with the rest of the 
world is quite magnificent.’9 
While Australia undoubtedly has a better human rights record than many other 
nations, the view that our record could not be significantly improved is no longer 
as readily accepted. Both the historic and contemporary weaknesses of the 
Australian record have been exposed, including by the federal government’s own 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission in regard to the forced 
removal of Aboriginal children from their families (the ‘stolen generations’),10 
and the detention of children seeking asylum and refuge and their consequential 
development of a range of mental health problems. 11  Developments after 
September 11, 2001 have also led people to question how well human rights are 
protected in Australia, particularly since the enactment of new laws on sedition; 
the detention of non-suspects by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisa-
tion; control orders that enable house arrest; and preventative detention whereby 
someone can be held without charge or trial.12 As Brian Burdekin, a former 
Australian Human Rights Commissioner, commented in 1994: ‘It is beyond 
question that our current legal system is seriously inadequate in protecting many 
of the rights of the most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups in our commu-
nity.’13 
The Victorian Charter of Rights is important not only because it is a signifi-
cant change to the text of law. It is also significant because it requires a 
re-evaluation of these and other traditional views about Australian politics and 
law as they relate to the protection of human rights. The Victorian Charter of 
Rights demonstrates that it is possible to look again at some of the most basic 
assumptions and beliefs that underlie our system of government, and as a result, 
to bring about legal reform. This contradicts the view that bills of rights are not 
politically achievable in Australia. While this drew strong support from the litany 
 
 8 Menzies, above n 4, 54. 
 9 ABC Radio, ‘Prime Minister Continues Push for Regional Services’, AM, 18 February 2000 
<http://www.abc.net.au/am/stories/s101290.htm>. 
 10 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Australia, Bringing Them Home: National 
Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Fami-
lies (1997). 
 11 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Australia, A Last Resort?: National Inquiry 
into Children in Immigration Detention (2004). 
 12 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch ch 5; Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 
(Cth) pt III div 3. See generally Andrew Lynch and George Williams, What Price Security? 
Taking Stock of Australia’s Anti-Terror Laws (2006). 
 13 Brian Burdekin, ‘Foreword’ in Philip Alston (ed), Towards an Australian Bill of Rights (1994) v, 
v. 
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of failures to achieve change around Australia,14 it has now been swept away by 
the successes in the ACT and Victoria, as well as by new national initiatives like 
that by New Matilda for a national bill of rights.15 
In this article, Part II explores the historical background to the Victorian Char-
ter of Rights, followed in Part III by the process that led to its enactment. I then 
examine in Part IV how the Victorian Charter of Rights has changed the law. 
Parts of this article are more personal and reflective than might normally be the 
case in an academic treatment of the Victorian Charter of Rights. This is because 
I chaired the Human Rights Consultation Committee (‘Consultation Committee’) 
which recommended to the Victorian Government that the Victorian Charter of 
Rights be enacted. Rather than seeking to artificially put myself at arms-length 
from a development in which I was a participant, I take the opportunity where 
appropriate to speak from my personal experience and perspective. 
I I   WHY IS  THERE NO AUSTRALIAN BILL OF  RIGHTS? 
Australia is now the only democratic nation in the world without a national bill 
of rights.16 Some comprehensive form of legal protection for basic rights is 
otherwise seen as an essential check and balance in democratic governance 
around the world. Indeed, I can find no example of a democratic nation that has 
gained a new Constitution or legal system in recent decades that has not included 
some form of a bill of rights, nor am I aware of any such nation that has done 
away with a bill of rights once it has been put in place. 
Why then is Australia the exception? The answer lies in our history. Although 
many think of Australia as a young country, constitutionally speaking, it is one of 
the oldest in the world. The Australian Constitution remains almost completely 
as it was when enacted in 1901, while the Constitutions of the Australian states 
can go back as far as the 1850s. The legal systems and Constitutions of the 
nation and the Australian colonies (and then states) were conceived at a time 
when human rights, with the prominent exception of the 1791 United States Bill 
of Rights, tended not to be protected through a single legal instrument. Certainly, 
there was then no such law in the United Kingdom, upon whose legal system 
ours is substantially based. This has changed, especially after World War II and 
the passage of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 17  but by then 
Australia’s system of government had been operating for decades. 
Not only is the Australian constitutional system old by world terms, but it has 
resisted change. As far back as 1967 Australia was described by Geoffrey Sawer 
as ‘[c]onstitutionally speaking … the frozen continent.’18 This is even more 
applicable today, with the last successful vote to change the Australian Constitu-
 
 14 See George Williams, The Case for an Australian Bill of Rights: Freedom in the War on Terror 
(2004) ch 5. 
 15 See generally New Matilda.com, A Human Rights Act for Australia <http://www.humanrights 
act.com.au>. New Matilda is an online magazine and policy portal providing a forum for com-
mentary on significant Australian and international issues. 
 16 See Gareth Griffith, ‘The Protection of Human Rights: A Review of Selected Jurisdictions’ 
(Briefing Paper No 3, Parliament of New South Wales, 2000). 
 17 GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd sess, 183rd plen mtg, UN Doc A/Res/217A (III) (1948). 
 18 Geoffrey Sawer, Australian Federalism in the Courts (1967) 208. 
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tion in 1977 when it was amended, among other things, to set a retirement age of 
70 years for High Court judges. A further eight unsuccessful proposals have been 
put to the people since that time. The period since 1977 is now the longest 
without any change to the Australian Constitution (the next longest period was 
between 1946 and 1967). The political party most often associated with constitu-
tional reform, the Australian Labor Party, has itself not succeeded in having the 
people support a referendum since 1946, with Labor governments putting 13 
failed proposals in ballots held in 1948, 1973, 1974, 1984 and 1988. By contrast, 
over 56 per cent of the member states of the United Nations made major changes 
to their Constitutions just between 1989 and 1999. Of the states making such 
changes, over 70 per cent adopted a completely new Constitution.19 
The Australian Constitution was drafted and consideration given to inserting 
guarantees of human rights at constitutional conventions held in the 1890s. At 
that time, it made sense to trust that the then British traditions of the common 
law and responsible government would protect human rights. There was an 
additional reason why comprehensive rights guarantees were not included in the 
new Australian Constitution — the framers sought to give the new federal and 
state Parliaments the power to pass racially discriminatory laws.20 This is clearly 
demonstrated by the drafting of certain provisions. For example, the Australian 
Constitution, as enacted in 1901, said little about indigenous peoples, but what it 
did say was entirely negative. Section 51(xxvi), the races power, enabled the 
federal Parliament to make laws with respect to ‘[t]he people of any race, other 
than the aboriginal race in any state, for whom it is deemed necessary to make 
special laws’, while under s 127, ‘[i]n reckoning the numbers of people of the 
Commonwealth, or of a State or other part of the Commonwealth, aboriginal 
natives shall not be counted.’ 
Section 51(xxvi) was inserted into the Australian Constitution to allow the 
Commonwealth to take away the liberty and rights of sections of the community 
on account of their race. By today’s standards, the reasoning behind the provi-
sion was racist. Edmund Barton, Australia’s first Prime Minster and later a High 
Court judge, stated at the 1898 Convention in Melbourne that the power was 
necessary to enable the Commonwealth to ‘regulate the affairs of the people of 
coloured or inferior races who are in the Commonwealth.’21 
One framer, Andrew Inglis Clark, the Tasmanian Attorney-General, supported 
a provision taken from the United States Constitution requiring the ‘equal 
protection of the laws.’22 This clause might have prevented the federal and state 
Parliaments from discriminating on the basis of race, and the other framers were 
concerned that Clark’s clause would override Western Australian laws under 
which ‘no Asiatic or African alien can get a miner’s right or go mining on a 
 
 19 See Heinz Klug, Constituting Democracy: Law, Globalism and South Africa’s Political 
Reconstruction (2000) 12. 
 20 Williams, Human Rights under the Australian Constitution, above n 2, 33–45. 
 21 Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Melbourne, 27 January 
1898, 228–9 (Edmund Barton). 
 22 See Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Sydney, 9 April 
1891, 962 (Draft of a Bill to Constitute the Commonwealth of Australia s 18). 
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gold-field.’23 Clark’s provision was rejected by the framers who instead inserted 
s 117 of the Australian Constitution, which merely prevents discrimination on 
the basis of state residence. In formulating s 117, Henry Higgins, one of the early 
members of the High Court, argued that it was acceptable because it would allow 
laws ‘with regard to Asiatics not being able to obtain miners’ rights in Western 
Australia. There is no discrimination there based on residence or citizenship; it is 
simply based upon colour and race.’24 While in a 1967 referendum Australians 
chose to strike out the words ‘other than the aboriginal race in any State’ in 
s 51(xxvi) and to delete s 127 entirely, the racist underpinnings of our Australian 
Constitution remain. 
The Australian Constitution as drafted and as modified on occasion, such as in 
1967, continues to shape Australian law and government as well as attitudes 
towards the legal protection of human rights. An example is the split decision in 
the 1998 High Court case Kartinyeri v Commonwealth,25 which did not resolve 
whether s 51(xxvi) could still be used to enact laws that discriminate against 
people on account of their race.26 This and other decisions demonstrate how 
Australia has yet to fully move on from a system of government founded upon 
law and values that led, in the first year of the new national Parliament, to the 
enactment of the White Australia Policy.27 
One way to break with this past is to recognise that the accepted wisdom of the 
1890s, at least as to issues of race and human rights, no longer holds true. This 
can be achieved by enacting new laws that protect freedoms from the misuse of 
public power and provide a way for Parliaments to pass laws and governments to 
apply them consistently with modern human rights principles like freedom from 
racial discrimination. While it is only a law of one state and cannot override 
national laws,28 the Victorian Charter of Rights is one such a law. 
III   THE ROAD TO THE VICTORIAN  CHARTER OF RIGHTS  
A  Origins 
The origins of the Victorian Charter of Rights lie in the initiative issued by 
Victorian Attorney-General Rob Hulls in May 2004 titled New Directions for the 
 
 23 Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Melbourne, 8 February 
1898, 665 (Sir John Forrest). 
 24 Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Melbourne, 3 March 
1898, 1801 (Henry Higgins). 
 25 (1998) 195 CLR 337. 
 26 See Justin Malbon, ‘Avoiding the Hindmarsh Island Bridge Disaster: Interpreting the Race 
Power’ (2002) 6 Flinders Journal of Law Reform 41; Alexander Reilly, ‘Reading the Race 
Power: A Hermeneutic Analysis’ (1999) 23 Melbourne University Law Review 476; George 
Williams, ‘Race and the Australian Constitution: From Federation to Reconciliation’ (2000) 38 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 643. 
 27 ‘Prohibited immigrants’ under Immigration Restriction Act 1901 (Cth) s 3(a) included ‘[a]ny 
person who fails to pass the dictation test: that is to say, who, when an officer dictates to him not 
less than fifty words in any prescribed language, fails to write them out in that language’. See, 
eg, the application of this Act in Potter v Minahan (1908) 7 CLR 277; R v Wilson; Ex parte 
Kisch (1934) 52 CLR 234. 
 28 Of course, only the converse is possible: see Australian Constitution s 109. 
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Victorian Justice System 2004–2014: Attorney-General’s Justice Statement. 29 
This statement proposed new directions for the Victorian justice system over the 
following decade and dealt with a wide range of matters, including the idea of a 
charter of human rights and responsibilities.30 The Justice Statement recognised 
the view that the common law and government by elected representatives 
adequately protects basic freedoms. However, it also argued for re-examining 
such beliefs to determine whether Victorian law should be changed to better 
protect human rights through a charter. The Justice Statement did not say that a 
charter was needed or commit to such change. It instead proposed a public 
discussion to address the issue. 
In April 2005, the Attorney-General announced the appointment of a four-per-
son Consultation Committee.31 It comprised Rhonda Galbally AO, renowned for 
her community leadership in addressing disadvantage and her advocacy for 
people with disabilities, Andrew Gaze, basketballer and captain of the Sydney 
2000 Olympic team, the Hon Professor Haddon Storey QC, a former Victorian 
Liberal Attorney-General, and myself as the chair.32 In dealing with legal issues, 
the Consultation Committee received considerable assistance from the Victorian 
Solicitor-General, Pamela Tate SC. 
The time frame was tight, with only six months given to consult with Victori-
ans and to report back to the Attorney-General by 30 November 2005. Some 
people were critical of the short time given for the consultation, with some 
expecting that a consultation of 12 months might have been allowed. However, 
the decision to provide only six months was both pragmatic and sensible. It was 
pragmatic because with a Victorian election due in November 2006, a 12-month 
consultation would not have allowed time for the implementation of any 
recommendations prior to the election. It was also sensible because six months 
was sufficient time for an intense and busy process to determine if people were 
in favour of change and, if so, generate momentum towards that end. There was 
a real possibility that a longer consultation may have allowed any momentum 
generated by the process to dissipate. 
The Consultation Committee was appointed to operate independently of the 
Attorney-General and of government. However, in May 2005, the Victorian 
Government released Human Rights in Victoria: Statement of Intent33 upon our 
appointment that set out the Government’s preferred position on any human 
 
 29 Attorney-General, Department of Justice, Victoria, New Directions for the Victorian Justice 
System 2004–2014: Attorney-General’s Justice Statement (2004) (‘Justice Statement’). 
 30 Ibid 52.  
 31 Office of the Attorney-General, ‘Hulls Appoints Panel To Lead Discussion on Human Rights’ 
(Press Release, 17 April 2005). 
 32 I did not expect that I would be a participant in this process as I expected that all Consultation 
Committee members would be Victorians. Moreover, before the process I had never met Attor-
ney-General Rob Hulls nor had I performed any work for the Victorian Government. My selec-
tion reflected the desire on the part of the Victorian Government to have someone chair the 
process with a strong academic and legal understanding of the issues. Except for a period spent 
in the United Kingdom, I spent almost all of the six months of the consultation based in Victoria. 
This proved essential given the extensive community discussions initiated by the Consultation 
Committee. 
 33 Department of Justice, Victoria, Human Rights in Victoria: Statement of Intent (2005) (‘State-
ment of Intent’). 
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rights model for the state. The Government indicated its preference for a limited 
set of human rights taken from the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights,34 and not for the protection of other rights taken from other conventions, 
such as women’s rights, indigenous rights, or economic, social and cultural rights 
more generally (such as the rights to education, housing and health). 35  The 
Government also indicated that it preferred to preserve the sovereignty of 
Parliament with the courts being given only a limited role, and that it was 
interested in a model like that in the United Kingdom and New Zealand, as 
adapted recently in the ACT, and did not favour anything like the constitutional 
bill of rights found in the United States. 
Like the short time frame given to the Consultation Committee for the consul-
tation process, the publication of the Statement of Intent attracted criticism. Some 
people, especially those in the community sector, argued that the Statement of 
Intent was too prescriptive and could be seen as prejudging the process. There 
was particular concern about the Statement of Intent excluding protection of 
economic, social and cultural rights from the Government’s preferred position. 
These criticisms had merit. Nonetheless, the Statement of Intent did play an 
important, perhaps even necessary, role in leading to the enactment of the 
Victorian Charter of Rights. By releasing the Statement of Intent, the Govern-
ment went beyond establishing the process merely to gauge community opinion 
to indicating a preference for a model should the community be in favour of a 
bill of rights. This made the Statement of Intent influential within government 
when the Consultation Committee reported in a form that fell within the prefer-
ences expressed in it. The Statement of Intent was also useful during the consul-
tations in giving community members a sense of the Government’s position. 
While the Consultation Committee asked members of the community 
open-ended questions that sought responses far broader than the preferences in 
the Statement of Intent, it was useful when people asked where the Government 
stood to be able to provide a specific response. 
B  The Community Consultation 
When the Consultation Committee first met after its appointment in April 
2005, we quickly realised the enormous challenges involved in consulting with 
Victorians about their views on human rights and whether state law needed to be 
changed to bring about a bill of rights. These included the alienation of many 
people from their system of law and government, the difficulties in having 
young people participate, and the need to work with government to ensure that 
recommendations made in light of community views were consistent with what 
could actually be implemented. 
A further major challenge was the ignorance of many Australians about the 
most basic issues at the centre of the consultation. This contributed to the 
alienation and anxiety felt by many people in regard to their system of govern-
 
 34 Opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) 
(‘ICCPR’). 
 35 See, eg, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 
16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976) (‘ICESCR’). 
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ment. A 1987 survey, for example, conducted for the Constitutional Commission 
found that 46.1 per cent of Australians were unaware that Australia has a written 
Constitution.36 Similarly, in 1994 the Civics Expert Group reported that only 18 
per cent of Australians had some understanding of what their Constitution 
contained.37 Significantly, only one in three people felt reasonably well informed 
about their rights and responsibilities as Australian citizens.38 
These findings have been replicated by a 2006 survey. Amnesty International 
Australia commissioned a nationwide poll of 1001 voters by Roy Morgan 
Research, the organisation that conducts the Morgan Gallop Poll, on a range of 
issues relating to anti-terrorism legislation and awareness of human rights.39 
Asked ‘how much do you know about your own human rights?’, only five per 
cent of people said ‘a great deal’, while 58 per cent said ‘a moderate amount’, 29 
per cent ‘a little’ and five per cent ‘nothing’.40 However, this must be seen in 
light of the answer given to the question of whether human rights are protected 
by a bill of rights. Remarkably, 61 per cent said they thought Australia does have 
such an instrument, with 13 per cent indicating ‘no’ and 26 per cent saying they 
could not say.41 This revealed even higher levels of factual error than earlier 
surveys. It reflects the significant public attention given to such matters after 
September 11, 2001 and the false assumptions about the legal system formed as a 
result, as well as assumptions based upon references to bills of rights in popular 
culture like US television programs. After informing Australians about the 
absence of a bill of rights, the survey asked whether they would support a bill of 
rights. Sixty-nine per cent answered they were ‘very likely’ or ‘likely’ do so, 
with 11 per cent saying they were ‘neither likely nor unlikely’ and only 14 per 
cent indicating they were ‘unlikely’ or ‘very unlikely’ to do so.42 This is consis-
tent with an opinion survey of 1505 citizens published in 1997 by political 
scientists Brian Galligan and Ian McAllister which found that 72 per cent of 
respondents supported some form of a bill of rights for Australia, with seven per 
cent opposed and 21 per cent having no opinion.43 
To meet these challenges the Consultation Committee developed a process to 
give as many Victorians as possible a genuine say about the issue at a grassroots 
level.44 It did so after examining the successful community-based process that 
 
 36 Constitutional Commission, ‘Many Australians Ignorant of Our Constitution’ [1987] 5 Bulletin 
6. 
 37 Civics Expert Group, Whereas the People …: Civics and Citizenship Education (1994) 19. 
 38 Ibid.  
 39 Roy Morgan Research, Anti-Terrorism Legislation Community Survey (2006) <http://acthra.anu. 
edu.au/articles/Anti-terror%20community%20survey%20report.pdf>. 
 40 Ibid 12. 
 41 Ibid. 
 42 Ibid 17. 
 43 Brian Galligan and Ian McAllister, ‘Citizen and Elite Attitudes towards an Australian Bill of 
Rights’ in Brian Galligan and Charles Sampford (eds), Rethinking Human Rights (1997) 144, 
149. 
 44 See generally Consultation Committee, Department of Justice, Victoria, Rights, Responsibilities 
and Respect: The Report of the Human Rights Consultation Committee (2005) 139–49 (‘Consul-
tation Committee Report’). 
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led to the ACT Human Rights Act.45 The Victorian process was very different 
from how other inquiries, such as parliamentary committees, normally operate. 
We believed that the way to get people involved was not through the media, but 
to meet with people in their communities in small groups and to work through 
their local and peak community organisations. In fact, we believed that the media 
would only be likely to polarise the issue and further alienate people by focusing 
the debate not on education and governance, but on controversial issues like 
abortion. Our process sometimes involved what we called ‘devolved consulta-
tion’ whereby we worked with other bodies, such as the Youth Affairs Council of 
Victoria, to assist us to reach people with special needs, such as homeless 
people.46 The process also involved extensive travel throughout Victoria. We 
talked to people ranging from community groups in Mildura, to indigenous 
people in Warrnambool, to the victims of crime and businesspeople in Mel-
bourne, to the Country Women’s Association in Gippsland.47 We paid particular 
attention to meeting with people who knew little or nothing about human rights 
and who might be the most alienated from the political and legal system. Rather 
than focusing upon the ‘converted’, we directed most of our time and energy to 
those people who are often the least likely to be interested in these issues or to 
take part in such a process. 
On the road, as well as in Melbourne, we held up to four meetings per day, 
with each typically lasting two hours. These were not open town hall meetings, 
but meetings with a Consultation Committee member, arranged through commu-
nity organisations or in some cases through information provided via the local 
media. The meetings were structured so that a large part of the time was spent 
listening to people and what they thought about the issues, followed by us 
providing the basic information they needed to have a say. We then directed the 
conversation to 10 key questions we needed their help to answer. At the end of 
the meeting, we encouraged people to reflect on the discussion, to talk to other 
people in their families and workplaces and to make a submission to the Consul-
tation Committee in writing. We also made a commitment to read every submis-
sion we received. 
The 10 key questions, as well as important background information, were set 
out in a 52-page booklet prepared by the Consultation Committee within a few 
weeks of its formation. The booklet, entitled Have Your Say about Human Rights 
in Victoria,48 was launched on 1 June 2005.49 It provided information about 
issues of governance and law explained, so far as possible, in a way that was 
accessible to a broad section of the community. Similar information was also set 
out on a website and shorter booklets and pamphlets prepared for indigenous 
 
 45 See ACT Bill of Rights Consultative Committee, Department of Justice and Community Safety, 
Australian Capital Territory, Towards an ACT Human Rights Act (2003); Williams, The Case for 
an Australian Bill of Rights, above n 14, 66–7. 
 46 See Consultation Committee, Consultation Committee Report, above n 44, 165–7. 
 47 See ibid 146–7. 
 48 Consultation Committee, Have Your Say about Human Rights in Victoria: Human Rights 
Consultation Community Discussion Paper (2005) (‘Community Discussion Paper’). 
 49 Office of the Attorney-General, Victoria, ‘Hulls: Have Your Say about Human Rights in Victoria’ 
(Press Release, 1 June 2005). 
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people and people speaking other languages. The 10 key questions that formed 
the focus of the consultation and these publications were: 
1 Is change needed in Victoria to better protect human rights? 
2 If change is needed, how should the law be changed to achieve this? 
3 If Victoria had a Charter of Human Rights, what rights should it protect? 
4 What should be the role of our institutions of government in protecting 
human rights? 
5 What should happen if a person’s rights are breached? 
6 What wider changes would be needed if Victoria brought about a Charter of 
Human Rights? 
7 What role could the wider community play in protecting and promoting 
human rights? 
8 What other strategies are needed to better protect human rights? 
9 If Victoria introduced a Charter of Human Rights, what should happen 
next? 
10 Is there anything else you would like to tell us about how human rights 
should be protected in Victoria?50 
Special materials were also prepared for young people to be used, for example, 
in schools. The Consultation Committee encouraged submissions from young 
people by email and through an interactive online submission form on our 
website. We found that many people who would not have been prepared to come 
to a community meeting, or to write a letter to the Consultation Committee, or to 
any government process were willing to provide their views on these questions, 
sometimes at great length, via these electronic means. 
The Consultation Committee also ran a parallel process of consultation with 
the Victorian government. We met with the judiciary, members of Parliament, 
independent government agencies and senior executives of government depart-
ments, sometimes on a number of occasions, in order to inform them of the 
process and to make sure their views were taken into account.51 I was also 
fortunate to address meetings of the Secretaries of all departments and to talk to 
a number of Cabinet Ministers. In addition, the Department of Justice set up an 
inter-departmental committee with representatives from across all of Victorian 
government to shadow our community process so that as ideas emerged, but 
before our report was written, departments had a chance to comment to ensure 
that our views were informed by current practice. This made a real and important 
difference. In many areas the experience and advice of government helped to 
shape outcomes to produce something that not only had broad community 
support but which could be implemented effectively and at the lowest cost. 
The involvement of government in the development of the Victorian Charter 
of Rights also gave the public servants involved a sense of ownership of reform. 
This may assist over the longer term in fostering a human rights culture within 
 
 50 Consultation Committee, Community Discussion Paper, above n 48, 6.  
 51 For the list of meetings, see Consultation Committee, Consultation Committee Report, 
above n 44, 189–90. 
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the bureaucracy. This has proved difficult in the United Kingdom, where a 2003 
report by the Audit Commission found that ‘a human rights culture takes time to 
develop. Our current findings show that progress is slow and in danger of 
stalling.’52 
C  What the Community Said 
The consultation process proved extremely successful in engaging with the 
community. We held 55 community meetings in Victoria as well as 75 more 
focused meetings with government, peak organisations and the like.53 In addi-
tion, a round table of academic and other experts from Australia and New 
Zealand was held to provide specific advice on legal questions.54 I also met with 
many people in the United Kingdom about the UK Human Rights Act when, 
during the consultation, I spent time in that country as part of a university-funded 
trip.55 
All up, the Consultation Committee received 2524 written submissions from 
across the community56 — most, in my assessment, from people who had never 
before made a written submission to any public process. These submissions, 
whether received via the internet, written on the back of a postcard or set out in a 
letter, amount to the highest number of submissions ever received for a process 
in Australia that has looked at this issue.57 By comparison, the New South Wales 
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Law and Justice that considered a bill of 
rights for New South Wales over 2000–01 received 141 submissions.58  
Of the submissions we received: 
• 2341 were from individuals. 
• 161 were from organisations.[59] Many of these organisations represented 
significant memberships. For example: 
- The [Alternative Life Style Organisation] Foundation (5000 mem-
bers); 
- Law Institute of Victoria (12 200 members); and 
- The Victorian Bar (over 2200 members). 
• 22 were reports from workshops conducted as part of the devolved con-
sultations.60 
 
 52 Audit Commission, United Kingdom, Human Rights: Improving Public Service Delivery (2003) 
16. 
 53 Consultation Committee, Consultation Committee Report, above n 44, 147. 
 54 Ibid. 
 55 Ibid. 
 56 Ibid 145. 
 57 Ibid v. 
 58 Standing Committee on Law and Justice, Parliament of New South Wales, A NSW Bill of Rights 
(2001) 141–5. 
 59 For the views of these organisations, see Consultation Committee, Consultation Committee 
Report, above n 44, 4. 
 60 Ibid 145. 
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After six months of listening to Victorians of all ages and backgrounds across 
the state, it was clear that a substantial majority wanted their human rights to be 
better protected by the law. While Victorians did not want radical change, they 
did support reform to strengthen their democracy and system of government. 
Overall, 84 per cent of the people we talked to or received submissions from (or 94 
per cent if petitions and the like are included)61 said that they wanted to see the 
law changed to better protect their human rights.62 
Many people wanted to see their human rights better protected to shield them-
selves and their families from the potential misuse of government power. For 
even more people, however, the desire for change reflected their aspiration to live 
in a society that strives for the values that they hold dear, such as equality, justice 
and a ‘fair go’ for all. The idea of a community based upon a culture of values and 
human rights is one that we heard again and again during our consultations. 
Victorians sought not just a new law, but something that could help build a society 
in which government, Parliament, the courts and the people themselves have an 
understanding of, and respect for, basic rights and responsibilities.63 
One of the many ways that community views had a direct impact upon the 
Victorian Charter of Rights was the inclusion of the term ‘responsibilities’ in its 
title. For many people, responsibilities were a more powerful way of addressing 
community problems than what they perceived to be more individualistic 
conceptions of human rights. For example, some argued in favour of both a right 
to vote and a responsibility to cast a vote as recognised in Australia’s system of 
compulsory voting. People across the community spoke positively about the idea 
of a document that recognised, even in symbolic terms, the interrelated nature of 
their human rights and responsibilities. The Victorian Charter of Rights, so far as 
I am aware, is the first such instrument in the world that includes a direct 
reference to responsibilities in its title.64 
The consultation process led to a 232-page report that made 35 recommenda-
tions. The report, delivered on time on 30 November 2005, was entitled Rights, 
Responsibilities and Respect: Report of the Human Rights Consultation Commit-
tee. The report included the Draft Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities 
prepared for the Consultation Committee by the Victorian Chief Parliamentary 
Counsel and his staff.65 With only minor modifications, this was the Victorian 
Charter of Rights enacted by the Victorian Parliament. 
 
 61 Ibid 146. 
 62 Ibid 145. 
 63 Ibid ii. 
 64 The Charter of Responsibilities Bill 2004 (ACT) was introduced into the ACT Legislative 
Assembly in response to the enactment of the ACT Human Rights Act. It was not passed by the 
Assembly: see Australian Capital Territory, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 18 
August 2004, 3873–86; Lara Kostakidis-Lianos and George Williams, ‘Bills of Responsibilities: 
Is One Needed To Counter the “Excesses” of the ACT Human Rights Act 2004?’ (2005) 30 
Alternative Law Journal 58. 
 65 Consultation Committee, Consultation Committee Report, above n 44, 191. 
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D  The Outcome 
The Consultation Committee Report was released to the public on 20 Decem-
ber 2005. On the same day, the Bracks Government indicated its acceptance of 
the central recommendation that the Victorian Parliament enact a charter of 
human rights and responsibilities.66 It also said, however, that it needed time to 
work through the recommendations.67 
After five months of working the detail and implications of the Consultation 
Committee Report through government, the Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities Bill 2006 (Vic) was introduced into the lower house of the 
Victorian Parliament on 2 May 2006. It was passed by the Legislative Assem-
bly on 15 June and then by the Legislative Council on 20 July, before being 
given assent by the Victorian Governor on 25 July 2006. 
The Victorian Charter of Rights comes into force on 1 January 2007, except 
for Divisions 3 and 4 of Part 3, dealing with the interpretation of laws and new 
obligations on public authorities, which is delayed to 1 January 2008.68 This is 
to give departments and other agencies assuming new obligations under the 
Victorian Charter of Rights the time to train their staff and scrutinise their 
existing practices, policies and laws for consistency with the instrument. The 
postponed operation of the Victorian Charter of Rights is similar to that which 
occurred in the United Kingdom, where a two-year period followed the 
enactment of the UK Human Rights Act before it came into force. 
IV  THE VICTORIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS  
A  The Model 
The Victorian Charter of Rights is not modelled on the United States Bill of 
Rights. It does not give the final say to the courts, nor does it set down un-
changeable rights in the Constitution Act 1975 (Vic). Instead, it is an ordinary 
Act of Parliament like the human rights laws operating in the ACT, New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom. This ensures the continuing sovereignty of 
the Victorian Parliament. The Victorian Charter of Rights, like those instruments, 
is a ‘parliamentary rights model’, to use a term coined by Janet L Hiebert,69 
rather than a law that focuses on enforcement by courts. 
As such, the Victorian Charter of Rights is designed to prevent human rights 
problems arising in the first place by improving the work of government and 
Parliament in the making and application of laws and policies. It does so by 
ensuring that human rights principles are a mandatory part of governmental 
decision-making. In this, the Victorian Charter of Rights is backed by a signifi-
 
 66 Office of the Attorney-General, Victoria, ‘Victoria Leads the Way on Human Rights’ (Press 
Release, 20 December 2005): ‘Victoria is set to become the first state in Australia to introduce a 
Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities, the Attorney-General, Rob Hulls, announced 
today.’ 
 67 Ibid. 
 68 Victorian Charter of Rights s 2. 
 69 Janet L Hiebert, ‘Parliamentary Bills of Rights: An Alternative Model?’ (2006) 69 Modern Law 
Review 7. 
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cant investment of money, with the 2006–07 Victorian budget allocating 
$6.5 million over four years for initiatives including a community education 
program and human rights training for agencies like Victoria Police.70 
The United Kingdom has a system of law and government similar to Victoria 
and the UK Human Rights Act has been a success without giving rise to the 
litigation and other problems sometimes associated with the United States Bill of 
Rights.71 Where it has been applied in the courts, the United Kingdom law has 
proved useful in balancing issues such as the need to fight terrorism with the 
democratic and other principles required for a free society.72 In Scotland, which 
has a similar population size to Victoria, an article surveying the impact of the 
UK Human Rights Act in the Scottish courts between May 1999 and August 2003 
found that human rights arguments were raised in ‘a little over a quarter of 1 per 
cent of the total criminal courts caseload over the period of the study.’73 Overall, 
the authors concluded that ‘it seems clear that human rights legislation has had 
little effect on the volume of business in the courts.’74 While it is expected that 
the Victorian Charter of Rights will have a major impact on how courts and other 
bodies perform their existing work, it is designed so as not to lead to a signifi-
cant increase in litigation. 
The Victorian Charter of Rights is written, as far as possible, in clear lan-
guage.75  It begins with a preamble that sets out the community values that 
underpin it: 
On behalf of the people of Victoria the Parliament enacts this Charter, recognis-
ing that all people are born free and equal in dignity and rights. 
This Charter is founded on the following principles — 
• human rights are essential in a democratic and inclusive society that 
respects the rule of law, human dignity, equality and freedom; 
• human rights belong to all people without discrimination, and the di-
versity of the people of Victoria enhances our community; 
• human rights come with responsibilities and must be exercised in a 
way that respects the human rights of others; 
• human rights have a special importance for the Aboriginal people of 
Victoria, as descendants of Australia’s first people, with their diverse 
spiritual, social, cultural and economic relationship with their tradi-
tional lands and waters. 
 
 70 Department of Justice, Victoria, 2006–07 Victorian Budget Fact Sheet: Victoria Leads the Way 
on Human Rights (2006). 
 71 See Department for Constitutional Affairs, United Kingdom, Human Rights Act 1998: A 
Statistical Update (November 2001) <http://www.dca.gov.uk/humanrights/hrimpact.htm>. 
 72 See, eg, A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [No 2] [2006] 2 AC 221 on the use of 
evidence obtained through torture. 
 73 Tom Mullen et al, ‘Human Rights in the Scottish Courts’ (2005) 32 Journal of Law and Society 
148, 152 (citations omitted). 
 74 Ibid 160. 
 75 An exception is s 39 which deals with legal proceedings. This reflects the need for the Victorian 
Charter of Rights to give rise to remedies as well as the preference expressed by the Government 
in its Statement of Intent that: ‘the Government does not wish to create new individual causes of 
action based on human rights breaches’: Department of Justice, Statement of Intent, above n 33. 
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The Consultation Committee hoped that at least this aspect of the Victorian 
Charter of Rights can be used in schools and for broader community educa-
tion.76 
B  Which Rights? 
The Victorian Charter of Rights protects the rights that are the most impor-
tant to an open and free Victorian democracy. The included rights extend to: 
• recognition and equality before the law; 
• right to life; 
• protection from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; 
• freedom from forced work; 
• freedom of movement; 
• privacy and reputation; 
• freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief; 
• freedom of expression; 
• peaceful assembly and freedom of association; 
• protection of families and children; 
• taking part in public life; 
• cultural rights; 
• property rights; 
• right to liberty and security of person; 
• humane treatment when deprived of liberty; 
• children in the criminal process; 
• fair hearing; 
• rights in criminal proceedings; 
• right not to be tried or punished more than once; and 
• retrospective criminal laws. 
These rights are contained in the ICCPR,77 to which Australia has been a party 
since 1980. Some of the rights in the ICCPR were modified or even not included 
so that the Victorian Charter of Rights would match the contemporary aspirations 
of the Victorian people and so that it would contain only those rights that have 
broad community acceptance. 
The two most contentious departures from the ICCPR are the rights to life and 
to self-determination. In regard to the former, the Consultation Committee 
received many submissions from people arguing with great passion both for and 
against abortion and for their position to be reflected in drafting any right-to-life 
provision. Unlike the general community support for other rights, there was no 
consensus when it came to the right to life as it applies to abortion. Given this, 
 
 76 Consultation Committee, Consultation Committee Report, above n 44, ii. 
 77 Opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976). 
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and the desire of the committee to recommend a bill of rights that was capable of 
unifying rather than dividing Victorians around a set of human rights, it was 
recommended that the right to life be modified by a subsection indicating that it 
‘applies to a person from the time of his or her birth.’78 This was modelled on 
s 9(2) of the ACT Human Rights Act. An even better solution was reached prior 
to the enactment of the Victorian Charter of Rights: s 48 now operates as a 
saving provision in stating that ‘nothing in this Charter affects any law applica-
ble to abortion or child destruction’. This avoids a direct restriction on as 
fundamental a right as that to life. It also ensures that when other rights in the 
Victorian Charter of Rights, such as that of privacy, might impact upon the 
abortion debate, they are incapable of doing so.79 The provision meant that the 
Victorian Charter of Rights could be enacted in a way that maintains the status 
quo in the law as it relates to abortion. Whether the law of abortion should be 
altered is left as a matter of ongoing political and legal debate in Victoria without 
the possibility of it being resolved by judicial determination under the Victorian 
Charter of Rights. 
The second contentious area is the right to self-determination, a right included 
in international conventions such as the ICCPR.80 Like the issue of abortion, this 
attracted strong views both for and against. Many indigenous people spoke 
powerfully in favour of the need to recognise self-determination because they 
felt it might assist with longstanding and unresolved governance issues. Others 
in the community opposed such a provision, perhaps exactly for this reason. The 
Consultation Committee took the view that a self-determination right should not 
be included because, not only did it lack clear community support, its application 
was also uncertain. This also reflected a view that while issues of indigenous 
self-governance were pressing and important, these cannot be adequately 
resolved through a human rights instrument like the Victorian Charter of 
Rights,81 but required a broader constitutional settlement through a treaty or 
other instrument.82 Although the Victorian Charter of Rights does not include a 
self-determination right, it does in s 19 contain cultural rights, including in 
sub-s (2) specific recognition of the ‘distinct cultural rights’ of Aboriginal 
persons. 
Many Victorians said that the Victorian Charter of Rights should contain 
rights relating to matters such as food, education, housing and health, as found in 
the ICESCR,83 as well as more specific rights for indigenous people, women and 
children. Overall, 41 per cent of submissions argued for the inclusion of 
 
 78 Draft Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities s 8(2). 
 79 See, eg, the use of privacy rights in this context in Roe v Wade, 410 US 113 (1973). 
 80 Opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, art 1 (entered into force 23 March 
1976). 
 81 Cf Melissa Castan and David Yarrow, ‘A Charter of (Some) Rights … for Some?’ (2006) 31 
Alternative Law Journal 132. 
 82 Consultation Committee, Consultation Committee Report, above n 44, 39. See also Sean 
Brennan et al, Treaty (2005). 
 83 Opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3, arts 11–13 (entered into force 3 January 
1976). 
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some or all of such rights,84 compared to 95 per cent which favoured the 
inclusion of civil and political rights.85 While the Consultation Committee 
agreed that these rights were important, and also that the distinction between 
these and civil and political freedoms could be arbitrary or even non-existent, it 
did not recommend that they be included in the Victorian Charter of Rights at 
this stage. Instead it was decided that the focus should be on those democratic 
rights with broad support that applied equally to everyone. This means that the 
Victorian Charter of Rights only includes human rights that had very strong, 
certainly at least majority, community support. 
C  The Changing Charter  
The rights included in (and excluded from) the Victorian Charter of Rights 
must be seen in light of the law encompassing a mechanism for review and 
change in four and then eight years (with further reviews then also possible).86 
This will enable a broader range of human rights as well as other issues to be 
considered again with the benefit of having seen the Victorian Charter of Rights 
in operation. A first review is mandatory by 1 October 2011, with s 44 stating 
that the Attorney-General ‘must cause’ a review to examine matters such as 
whether additional human rights, including a right to self-determination and 
rights contained in the ICESCR, should be included in the Victorian Charter of 
Rights. This gives the proponents of such rights a four-year period in which to 
educate the community and to make the case for their inclusion. Without this, it 
seems unlikely that they will be added given that they do not form a significant 
part of most other similar instruments, such as the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 (NZ) and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The South 
African Bill of Rights is the most notable exception, but with the very different 
history and cultural and political traditions of that nation,87 it is not a model that 
has proved sufficiently influential in Australia. 
These mandatory reviews demonstrate how the Victorian Charter of Rights is 
not a one-off piece of legislation designed to set down unchangeable human 
rights in Victorian law. The Consultation Committee viewed the Victorian 
Charter of Rights as only the first step in the better protection of human rights in 
the state. This was one reason why, based on strong community views, it rejected 
the entrenchment of human rights in a constitutional form like the United States 
Bill of Rights. Rather than permanently including (or excluding) rights that might 
be viewed differently with the benefit of hindsight (such as the ‘right of the 
people to keep and bear arms’ in the Second Amendment to the United States 
Constitution), the expectation was that the Victorian Charter of Rights be 
updated and improved with the benefit of experience and in line with 
 
 84 Consultation Committee, Consultation Committee Report, above n 44, 27. 
 85 Ibid 26. 
 86 Victorian Charter of Rights pt 5.  
 87 See Devika Hovell and George Williams, ‘A Tale of Two Systems: The Use of International Law 
in Constitutional Interpretation in Australia and South Africa’ (2005) 29 Melbourne University 
Law Review 95. 
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community thinking. The Victorian Charter of Rights is designed to be the start 
of long-term incremental change, not the end of it. 
D  Limiting and Overriding Human Rights 
As with other bills of rights, the human rights set out in the Victorian law are 
not absolute. They can be limited where the circumstances justify it. This 
provides a framework within which the Victorian Parliament can continue to 
make decisions on behalf of the community about matters such as how best to 
balance rights against each other, protect Victorians from crime, and distribute 
limited funds amongst competing demands. Under the Victorian Charter of 
Rights Parliament can make such decisions informed by, but without having to 
defer unduly to, judicial pronouncements on such subjects. 
In some cases the contestable nature of human rights must be implied from an 
instrument, such as in the case of the United States Bill of Rights. On the other 
hand, s 7(2) of the Victorian Charter of Rights provides: 
A human right may be subject under law only to such reasonable limits as can 
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom, and taking into account all relevant factors in-
cluding — 
(a) the nature of the right; and 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; and 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; and 
(d) the relationship between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) any less restrictive means reasonably available to achieve the purpose 
that the limitation seeks to achieve. 
In setting out the factors in sub-ss (a) to (e), it is more explicit than most other 
like instruments, such as the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms which 
only states in s 1 that rights are ‘subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed 
by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.’ In 
spelling matters out to a higher degree, the Victorian Charter of Rights draws 
upon the drafting of the limitation of rights clause in s 36 of the South African 
Bill of Rights. 
The use of more explicit terms in the Victorian Charter of Rights reflects 
broader goals about its role in Victorian government. A clause like that in the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms leaves much unsaid including, 
crucially, the key factors and analytical approach to be applied in determining 
whether a limitation can be justified. This is not a major impediment for courts 
and lawyers capable of quickly recognising that the spare words of the section 
require a form of proportionality analysis like that applied by Dickson CJC for 
the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Oakes.88 On the other hand, such a clause is 
not readily accessible for people without legal training who must apply the Victo-
rian Charter of Rights in policy and other contexts, such as departmental officers 
and members of the Victorian Parliament. The direct invocation of the relevant 
 
 88 [1986] 1 SCR 103, 142–3. 
   
M.U.L.R. — Williams —page 899 of 26
  
2006] Victorian Charter: Origins and Scope 899 
     
factors in the Victorian Charter of Rights makes its operation more transparent and 
accessible and lessens the need for non-lawyers and political actors to place heavy 
reliance upon legal advice. This is appropriate for a law that is less focused on 
litigation in courts than upon the choices and cultures that pervade government and 
Parliament. It also makes the Victorian Charter of Rights less opaque for members 
of the public who want to understand the circumstances in which their rights can be 
limited. 
The Victorian Charter of Rights further recognises the power of the Victorian 
Parliament not just to balance human rights and other interests but to override the 
rights listed therein. This is similar to s 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, which allows for a renewable five-year means by which Parliament 
can indicate that a law ‘shall operate notwithstanding’ a provision in specified 
sections of that instrument. Section 31(1) of the Victorian Charter of Rights states 
that Parliament may expressly declare that an Act or provision ‘has effect despite 
being incompatible with one or more of the human rights or despite anything 
else set out in this Charter.’ The declaration lasts for five years, and can be 
renewed. Its effect is recognised in s 31(6) as being that ‘to the extent of the 
declaration this Charter has no application to that provision’ (for example, a 
court might be excluded from making a declaration of inconsistent interpretation 
with regard to the provision). 
As a matter of law, the override clause in the Victorian Charter of Rights is 
unnecessary. The Victorian law, unlike the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, is an ordinary Act of Parliament that, by the application of the 
traditional principles of parliamentary sovereignty, can be amended or repealed 
by a future Act. It is thus possible to override any of the rights in the Victorian 
Charter of Rights without recourse to a special mechanism. However, it is this 
very possibility that justifies its inclusion. Section 31 provides a means within 
the Victorian Charter of Rights whereby political imperatives can be met without 
the need to amend the Victorian Charter of Rights itself. In addition, the mecha-
nism has a limited lifespan (though, significantly, it does extend beyond the life 
of a Parliament), meaning that the decision must be reassessed again in five 
years.89 Although it is still possible to override human rights by amending the 
Victorian Charter of Rights itself, this is less likely to occur given that there is 
the option of using s 31. Overall, use of s 31 is preferable to a permanent 
amendment of the Victorian Charter of Rights enacted at a time of crisis that 
might damage the legitimacy of the instrument. 
It can be argued that the inclusion of the override mechanism is dangerous 
because it allows Victorian Charter of Rights to be overridden where a law could 
not be justified under the s 7 limitation clause.90 This is a real risk, but it is a low 
one because of the high political cost involved in using s 31. Section 31(4) states 
that ‘[i]t is the intention of Parliament that an override declaration will only be 
made in exceptional circumstances’, while s 31(3) provides that the member of 
Parliament introducing a Bill containing an override declaration must make a 
statement to Parliament ‘explaining the exceptional circumstances that justify the 
 
 89 Victorian Charter of Rights s 31(7). 
 90 Though, it might also be said that s 31 merely expressly states what is possible in any event. 
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inclusion of the override declaration.’ This non-justiciable requirement requires a 
level of transparency and compelling political justification that sets a major 
hurdle to using the override. In Canada, where there is not the same express need 
to justify the use of the override, the mechanism has been very rarely used. In 
fact, apart from Quebec, which already had its own bill of rights and saw no need 
for the new Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Canadian Parliaments 
have been extremely reluctant to use the override provision. The political price 
has been too high. A government desiring, for example, to override a ‘right not to 
be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment’ must be prepared 
to meet strong and organised resistance from many sections of the community. 
E  Obligations on Public Authorities 
Section 38 of the Victorian Charter of Rights states that ‘it is unlawful for a 
public authority to act in a way that is incompatible with a human right or, in 
making a decision, to fail to give proper consideration to a relevant human right.’ 
Section 4 contains an elaborate definition of what is a ‘public authority’. The 
essence is that it is ‘an entity whose functions are or include functions of a public 
nature, when it is exercising those functions on behalf of the State or a public 
authority (whether under contract or otherwise)’.91 Hence, the definition can 
capture private bodies where they are exercising public power on behalf of the 
state. While a note to s 4 states that this does not include a non-government 
school in educating students (because it is not doing so on behalf of the state), 
the definition would include a privately-run prison conferred with the coercive 
powers of the state to deprive people of their liberty due to a criminal conviction. 
Under the Victorian Charter of Rights a breach of this obligation can give rise 
to remedies. However, the Victorian Charter of Rights does not itself create new 
causes of action. It merely recognises that existing causes of action, especially 
administrative review and injunctive relief, are possible. The section further 
excludes the creation of new causes of action for damages for breaches of the 
Victorian Charter of Rights, thereby foreclosing a new public law right to 
damages like that developed in New Zealand under the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 (NZ).92 This is captured in Victorian Charter of Rights s 39, a 
provision that can require multiple readings to yield a coherent meaning:93 
(1) If, otherwise than because of this Charter, a person may seek any relief or 
remedy in respect of an act or decision of a public authority on the ground 
that the act or decision was unlawful, that person may seek that relief or 
remedy on a ground of unlawfulness arising because of this Charter. 
 
 91 Victorian Charter of Rights s 4(1)(c). 
 92 Simpson v A-G (NZ) [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (‘Baigent’s Case’). 
 93 As to the reason for this awkward wording, see above n 75. No blame can be attributed to the 
drafters. The provision went through many versions, but this was the best that the collective 
wisdom of a number of people, including myself, could produce. 
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(2) This section does not affect any right that a person has, otherwise than 
because of this Charter, to seek any relief or remedy in respect of an act 
or decision of a public authority, including a right — 
(a) to seek judicial review under the Administrative Law Act 1978 or 
under Order 56 of Chapter I of the Rules of the Supreme Court; and 
(b) to seek a declaration of unlawfulness and associated relief including 
an injunction, a stay of proceedings or exclusion of evidence. 
(3) A person is not entitled to be awarded any damages because of a breach 
of this Charter. 
(4) Nothing in this section affects any right a person may have to damages 
apart from the operation of this section. 
The Victorian Charter of Rights goes significantly further than the ACT Hu-
man Rights Act, which neither imposes obligations nor recognises remedies in 
regard to the contravention of human rights by public authorities. This is a major 
weakness of that Act, in that it is simply silent on key issues of compliance and 
enforcement.94 On the other hand, although the Victorian provisions are drawn 
from the UK Human Rights Act, they are not as broad or as straightforward. 
Section 8(1) of the UK Human Rights Act simply states: 
In relation to any act (or proposed act) of a public authority which the court 
finds is (or would be) unlawful, it may grant such relief or remedy, or make 
such order, within its powers as it considers just and appropriate.95 
F  A ‘Dialogue’ about Rights 
An important aim of the Victorian Charter of Rights is to foster a dialogue both 
within and between the arms of government as to the consistency of laws and 
governmental action on the enacted civil and political rights. In this, it replicates 
one of the central objects of the ACT Human Rights Act.96  Whether or not 
‘dialogue’97 is the correct word for what the Victorian Charter of Rights will 
 
 94 But see ACT Department of Justice and Community Safety, Human Rights Act 2004: 
Twelve-Month Review — Report (2006) 33: 
The Government should examine options for amending the HRA to include a direct duty on 
public authorities to comply with human rights and a direct right of action. Any proposal will 
need to address the scope of the duty and the sanctions, if any, for breach. These should be 
subject to a bar on any new right to compensation arising from breach, following the model 
recently adopted in Victoria. 
 95 The section does, however, go on to regulate when damages may be awarded by stating, among 
other things, that ‘[n]o award of damages is to be made unless … the court is satisfied that the 
award is necessary to afford just satisfaction to the person in whose favour it is made’: UK 
Human Rights Act s 8(4). 
 96 ACT Bill of Rights Consultative Committee, above n 45, ch 4; see especially at 66–8. 
 97 For the first use of this now widely used term, see Peter W Hogg and Allison A Bushell, ‘The 
Charter Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such 
a Bad Thing After All)’ (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 75. This use of the ‘dialogue’ 
metaphor has provoked intense debate in Canada: see Christopher P Manfredi and James B 
Kelly, ‘Six Degrees of Dialogue: A Response to Hogg and Bushell’ (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall Law 
Journal 513, and the further response by Peter W Hogg and Allison A Thornton, ‘Reply to “Six 
Degrees of Dialogue”’ (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 529. Amongst the now large vol-
ume of literature, see also Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or De-
mocratic Dialogue (2001), and for an Australian treatment, see Leighton McDonald, ‘Rights, 
“Dialogue” and Democratic Objections to Judicial Review’ (2004) 32 Federal Law Review 1. 
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achieve, it is clear that it does create new and innovative forms of deliberation 
and interaction for law, policy and politics as they relate to human nights. This 
can be seen in the following areas where the Victorian Charter of Rights will be 
applied. 
First, within the executive, public servants must take the human rights in the 
Victorian Charter of Rights into account in applying existing and developing 
new policies and laws. Government departments and other public authorities 
may also undertake audits of their programmes and policies to ascertain 
whether they comply with the Victorian Charter of Rights. Where decisions 
need to be made about new laws or major policies, submissions to Cabinet 
will be accompanied by a human rights impact statement.98 
Second, when a Bill is introduced into the Victorian Parliament, it must be 
accompanied by a Statement of Compatibility made by the person introducing 
the Bill which sets out, with reasons, whether the Bill complies with the Victo-
rian Charter of Rights. 99  Parliament may pass the Bill whether or not it is 
thought to comply with the Victorian Charter of Rights. In addition, Parliament’s 
Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee must advise Parliament on whether 
each Bill is consistent with human rights.100 
Third, Victorian courts and tribunals must interpret, ‘[s]o far as it is possible to 
do so consistently with their purpose, all statutory provisions … in a way that is 
compatible with human rights.’ 101  Like the ACT Human Rights Act, 102  this 
provision makes express reference to the purpose of legislation as a factor in the 
interpretative process in order to ensure that this is not overcome by the words 
‘so far as it is possible to do so’, as is found without qualification in the UK 
Human Rights Act.103 The Attorney-General104 and Victorian Equal Opportunity 
and Human Rights Commission105 may intervene in a court or tribunal that is 
applying the Victorian Charter of Rights to put submissions on behalf of the 
government and the public interest.106 According to the normal rules of court and 
common law principles applying to interveners and amicus curiae, community 
and other groups may also be given leave to intervene. 
Where legislation cannot be interpreted in a way that is consistent with a 
human right, the Supreme Court of Victoria may make a ‘declaration of inconsis-
tent interpretation’.107 The use of this title for the declaration rather than ‘decla-
 
 98 See generally Simon Evans, ‘Improving Human Rights Analysis in the Legislative and Policy 
Processes’ (2005) 29 Melbourne University Law Review 665. 
 99 Victorian Charter of Rights s 28. 
100 Victorian Charter of Rights s 30. 
101 Victorian Charter of Rights s 32(1). 
102 ACT Human Rights Act s 30. 
103 Section 3(1) of the UK Human Rights Act states: ‘So far as it is possible to do so, primary 
legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compati-
ble with the Convention rights.’ See Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] 2 AC 557 for the appli-
cation of this section. 
104 Victorian Charter of Rights s 34. 
105 Victorian Charter of Rights s 40. 
106 See Consultation Committee, Consultation Committee Report, above n 44, iv. 
107 Victorian Charter of Rights s 36. As to the constitutionality of such a mechanism, see Wendy 
Lacey and David Wright, ‘Highlighting Inconsistency: The Declaration as a Remedy in Admin-
istrative Law and International Human Rights Standards’ in Chris Finn (ed), Shaping Adminis-
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ration of incompatibility’, as used in the ACT Human Rights Act and UK Human 
Rights Act,108 indicates that the Court is not so much holding that Parliament has 
enacted legislation that is incompatible with human rights as that the Court has 
taken a contrary view to Parliament on interpretative issues, such as the content 
of the relevant right or the application of the limitations clause in s 7. This may 
make it less difficult for Parliament, after reviewing the declaration, to maintain 
its own contrary interpretation. A declaration of inconsistent interpretation does 
not strike down the law nor alter its application.109 Instead, the Court must cause 
a copy of the declaration to be provided to the Attorney-General.110 The respon-
sible Minister then has six months to prepare a written response to be laid before 
Parliament,111 which may decide to amend the law or to leave it in place without 
change. 
V  CONCLUSION 
The Victorian Charter of Rights marks an important shift not only in Austra-
lian law but in approaches to politics and the development of policy as they 
relate to human rights. To focus narrowly on the Victorian Charter of Rights as it 
applies to courts is to misunderstand its operation and to take far too limited a 
perspective of its significance. Although the judiciary does have an important 
role, such as in providing remedies for breaches, interpreting laws and making 
declarations of inconsistent interpretation, it is not the main body for the 
protection of human rights under the Victorian Charter of Rights. 
The real focus of the Victorian Charter of Rights is upon ensuring that funda-
mental principles of human rights are taken into account at the earliest stages of 
the development of law and policy. The Victorian Charter of Rights recognises 
that the decisive point in achieving protection for human rights is not in court 
after a breach has occurred, but in government and Parliament in the develop-
ment of policy and the drafting of law before either come into effect. This 
preventative aspect of the Victorian Charter of Rights means that human rights 
principles will be taken into account not just in courts but throughout govern-
ment. Indeed, the role of protecting human rights under the Charter will be 
exercised far more frequently by government than the courts. Victoria Police, for 
example, will have day-to-day responsibility for applying human rights in 
protecting the community from crime and safeguarding the rights of accused. 
They, like courts, will apply human rights in interpreting the laws that define 
 
trative Law for the Next Generation: Fresh Perspectives: Papers Presented at the 2004 National 
Administrative Law Forum (2005) 32, 51–4; Geoffrey Lindell, ‘The Statutory Protection of 
Rights and Parliamentary Sovereignty: Guidance from the United Kingdom?’ (2006) 17 Public 
Law Review 188, 204–7; James Stellios, ‘Federal Dimensions to the ACT Human Rights Act’ 
(2005) 47 AIAL Forum 33. 
108 ACT Human Rights Act s 32; UK Human Rights Act s 4. See also the implication of a power to 
make such a declaration into the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ) in Moonen v Film 
and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9. In 2001, a declaration of incompatibility 
mechanism was inserted as s 92J into the Human Rights Act 1993 (NZ), a statute directed at 
remedying discrimination rather than being a bill of rights. 
109 Victorian Charter of Rights s 36(5). 
110 Victorian Charter of Rights s 36(6). 
111 Victorian Charter of Rights s 37. 
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their role and powers. In this and other areas, such as mental health and child 
protection, the Victorian Charter of Rights will require that the work of govern-
ment be undertaken fairly with due regard to our common freedoms. 
Of course, government, Parliament and the courts in Victoria already had 
regard to human rights prior to the Victorian Charter of Rights, often to those 
rights set out in international law. The Charter was not inserted into a system in 
which human rights were ignored. However, the use of human rights principles 
often occurred in an ad hoc way because there was no obligation in Victorian law 
for human rights to be considered, nor were the rights set out in a clear instru-
ment enacted by Parliament. The Victorian Charter of Rights will mean that 
fundamental rights are given a higher status and legitimacy within government 
and the community. Their protection will be approached more seriously and 
systematically. 
The Victorian Charter of Rights will not only promote better regard for human 
rights principles, it will improve the quality of work by Victoria’s public institu-
tions — it is based on the idea that government should be transparent in its 
treatment of principles like human rights and also accountable to the people by 
operating fairly and without adverse discrimination. For example, the require-
ment for Statements of Compatibility in Parliament whereby key information is 
brought to public attention about the impact of a Bill will improve deliberation 
about changes to the law. This may also improve media coverage and community 
understanding of the work of government. 
In many ways the Victorian Charter of Rights is modest. It does not disturb 
accepted principles of parliamentary sovereignty and does not confer the powers 
associated with many bills of rights, like the power of courts to have the final say 
by striking down inconsistent laws. The Victorian Charter of Rights also 
excludes the possibility of a new right of damages and is not comprehensive in 
protecting the wide range of rights recognised in international law. Criticism can 
fairly be levelled at the Victorian Charter of Rights on the basis that it does not 
provide everything that might be hoped for from a comprehensive protection for 
human rights. But this is to miss the point. Like the ACT Human Rights Act 
before it, the Victorian Charter of Rights is only the beginning of a journey to 
better protect freedoms in Victorian law. It is a first step that will provide 
valuable insights for government and the community as to how effective the law 
can be in protecting human rights. It will also show how any law has its limits, 
and indeed how the law can be ineffective in dealing with some of the most 
pressing, but intractable, problems. This will reveal how any strategy for better 
human rights protection must also pay close attention to political culture and 
leadership, the media and community education and attitudes. Without rein-
forcement from these quarters, the positive impact of the Victorian Charter of 
Rights will be blunted. 
Over time, I hope that the Victorian Charter of Rights, through education and 
other means, will contribute to increasing respect and tolerance in the commu-
nity for others, especially for those who are perceived to be ‘different’ as a result 
of their culture, religious beliefs or otherwise. The fact that the Victorian Charter 
of Rights has been arrived at after a grassroots community process may be 
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significant in whether this is achieved. 112  One of the weaknesses of other 
instruments, such as the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ) and the UK 
Human Rights Act, that have been enacted without significant community debate 
or engagement, is that they can lack a crucial ingredient of community owner-
ship necessary to their long-term effectiveness. After all, the most important way 
that human rights are protected is usually not by institutions of government or in 
the law, but by how they are respected in relationships between people in their 
everyday lives. What people often find the most hurtful is not how they are 
affected by government but when they are ill-treated by other members of the 
community, such as a result of racism. These are problems that no law, by itself, 
can remedy. 
 
112 It may also assist in avoiding some of the myths and misconceptions that have affected public 
perceptions of the UK Human Rights Act: see Department for Constitutional Affairs, United 
Kingdom, Review of the Implementation of the Human Rights Act (2006). 
